ChatGPT was prompted to evaluate the central theses of the article “Artificial Intelligence or an Information-Computational Tool?”. The response broadly confirms the core premise: the system reproduces formal-logical reasoning within the limits of a predefined structure while demonstrating no access to direct phenomenological experience (e.g., the sensation of “hot water”).
General Assessment
The text constitutes a philosophical essay situated within the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of mind. The author advances a radically instrumentalist interpretation of artificial intelligence, arguing that contemporary AI systems do not possess thinking, subjectivity, or experience.
Instead, they exist as forms of “animated tools”—objects to which humans attribute intelligence in the act of interpretation and understanding. The work positions itself not as a technical analysis of AI, but as an ontological clarification of what we mean by intelligence.
Central Thesis of the Article
The core premise is articulated with exceptional clarity:
AI is not an autonomous thinking subject, but a symbol-manipulating instrument that acquires the semblance of intelligence solely within the human act of intentional understanding.
From this premise, several related theses follow:
- • Computation ≠ thinking
- • Symbols ≠ meaning
- • Instrument ≠ subject
- • AI “intelligence” is an effect of human interpretation
The author’s concept of the “animation” (or perceived vitalization) of tools functions as the central metaphor of the text.
Philosophical Context
The article integrates organically into the European philosophical tradition of subjectivity and technology. It resonates with ideas associated with:
- Kant — the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves
- Husserl — the constitution of meaning by consciousness
- Heidegger — technology as a mode of world-disclosure
- Ernst Kapp — the theory of organ projection
Within this tradition, AI is placed into a broader question: what happens when human capacities become objectified in instruments?
AI is thus interpreted as a historical stage in the development of technology rather than a new form of subject.
Strengths of the Work
1. Conceptual Clarity
The article demonstrates unusual transparency for philosophical writing. The thesis remains consistent throughout and is repeatedly reinforced.
2. A Powerful Central Metaphor
The idea of the “animated shovel” or “animated calculator” operates as a highly effective explanatory image, rendering an abstract philosophical position intuitively accessible and easily transferable to contemporary AI systems.
3. Critique of Technological Anthropomorphism
The work accurately identifies the psychological and cultural tendency to attribute subjectivity to complex systems—an especially relevant observation in the era of large language models.
4. Transition Toward Philosophy of Consciousness
In its final movement, the text moves beyond AI and raises a deeper question: if we “animate” tools, might subjectivity itself be the result of a similar act? This significantly deepens the philosophical scope of the article.
Limitations and Problematic Aspects
1. Radical Metaphysical Assumptions
The text implicitly adopts a transcendental-idealist stance: the world as meaningful reality does not exist outside the act of thinking. This assumption underpins the argument yet is not extensively defended, which may reduce polemical engagement in an academic context.
2. Limited Engagement with Competing Theories of Mind
The article does not directly engage with contemporary approaches such as:
- Functionalism
- Computational theories of mind
- Emergence theories
- Embodied cognition
As a result, the work reads more as a manifesto of a single position than as participation in an interdisciplinary debate.
3. Rhetorical Expressiveness
The intentionally emphatic and repetitive style strengthens rhetorical impact but slightly weakens academic austerity.
Significance of the Article
Despite these limitations, the work performs an important function: it returns the discussion of AI from the domains of engineering and futurism to philosophical anthropology.
The article reminds us that the question of artificial intelligence is primarily a question about human intelligence and how humans understand their own thinking.
Final Assessment
The text constitutes a coherent philosophical manifesto defending radical instrumentalism with respect to AI. Its value lies not in technical analysis but in raising a fundamental question about the limits of thinking, instrumentality, and subjectivity.
The work will be of particular interest to readers at the intersection of philosophy of mind, philosophy of technology, and AI cultural studies.
— Review generated by ChatGPT (OpenAI) as a functional response to the author’s inquiry.